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Plato* Sophist, 251-259
J. L. Ackrill, U niversity o f Chicago
This paper was presented by J. L. Ackrill to the Societyfo r Ancient Greek Philosophy at its meeting in
Boston in 1955. It has been copiedfrom a decaying text by A. Preus, February/March 2017.
This section o f the Sophist is no doubt one o f the m ost important Mid controversial
passages in Plato’s dialogues. My purpose is not to attem pt a full interpretation o f it, but to
discuss one question, taking up in particular some rem arks made by Professor Comford (in
Plato ’s Theory o f Knowledge) and by M r. R. Robinson (in his paper on Plato’s Parmenides,
Classical Philology, 1942).
It may be useful to give first a very b rief and unargued analysis o f the passage. Plato
seeks to prove that concepts1 are related in certain definite ways, that there is a συμπλοκή είδών
(251d-252e). N ext (253) he assigns to philosophy or dialectic the task o f discovering what these
relations are: the philosopher w ill have a clear view o f the whole range o f concepts and o f how
they are inter-connected, w hether in genus-species pyram ids or in other ways. Plato now gives a
sample o f such philosophizing. Choosing some concepts highly relevant to problems already
broached in the Sophist he first (254-255) establishes that they are all different one from the
other (the philosopher m ust μήτε ταύτόν είδος ετερον ήγήσασθαι μήτε ετερον δν ταύτόν 253dl3); and then (255e-258) elicits the relationships in w hich they stand to one another. The effort to
discover and state these relationships throw s light on the puzzling notions δν and μή δν and
enables Plato (259) to set aside with contem pt certain puzzles and paradoxes propounded by
superficial thinkers. He refers finally (259e) to the absolute necessity there is for concepts to be
in definite relations to one another if there is to be discourse at all; διά γάρ την άλλήλων των
είδών συμπλοκήν ό λόγος γέγονεν ήμΐν.
The question I w ish to raise is this. Is it correct to say that one o f Plato’s achievements in
this passage is the ‘discovery o f the copula’, or the ‘recognition o f ambiguity o f εστιν’ as used on
the one hand in statements o f identity and on the other hand in attributive statements? I feel little
doubt that it is correct to say this, but Com ford and Robinson (to mention no others) deny it.
A fter a rem ark on the question itself I shall try state briefly a case for answering it affirmatively,
and shall then consider some o f the counter-argum ents that have been put forward.
As for the question itself: clearly we should be concerned with whether Plato made a
philosophical advance w hich we might reasonably describe in such phrases as I have quoted, but
no great stress is to be laid on these particular phrases. Thus it is no doubt odd to say that Plato
(or anyone else) discovered the popula. But did he draw attention to it? Did he expound or
expose the various roles o f the verb είναι? M any o f his predecessors and contemporaries reached
bizarre conclusions by confusing different uses o f the w ord; did Plato respond by elucidating
these different uses? These are the real questions. Again, it would be pedantic to deny that Plato
recognized the am biguity o f εστιν m erely on the ground that he had no word meaning
‘am biguity’, or on the ground tjjqt he nowhere says ‘the word εστιν sometimes m ean s....... and
sometimes means .....’. I f he in fact glosses or explains or analyses the meaning o f a word in one
1 The use o f this term may seem provocative. But whether or not the είδη and γένη o f the Sophist are something
more than ‘mere’ concepts, a good deal o f interpretation o f 251-259 can satisfactorily proceed on the assumption
that they are at least ‘concepts’.
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way in some contexts and in another in others, and if this is part o f a serious exposition o f
doctrine, then it may very well be right to credit him w ith ‘recognizing an am biguity’. The
serious objects to attributing to Plato the ‘discovery o f the copula’ are not, o f course, o f this
pedantic kind, but involve real problem s o f interpretation. I have mentioned these trivial points
only in order to indicate, by contrast, what the substantial question at issue is.
It is generally agreed (and Comford does not deny this, p. 296) that Plato marks o ff the
existential use o f εστιν from at least some other use. He does not o f course do this by simply
saying ‘sometimes but not always the verb εστιν means “exists”’. If Greeks had a fam iliar word
for ‘exists’ as opposed to ‘is ....’ there would have been no Parmenidean confusion for Plato and
A ristotle to clear up. How Plato does proceed can be seen from his remark about κίνησις at
256al : εστι δε γε διά το μετέχειν τοΰ δντος. This διά does not introduce a p ro o fthat κίνησις
εστιν: this was already agreed before and used to establish a connection between κίνησις and το
ον (254dl0). Nor, obviously, does it introduce the cause why κίνησις εστιν: it does not refer to
some event or state w hich resulted in the further state described by die sentence κίνησις εστιν.
The words introduced by δία give an expansion or analysis o f εστιν, as this word is used in
κίνησις εστιν, i.e. as used existentially. Μ ετέχει του δντος is the philosopher’s equivalent o f the
existential εστιν; but, as w ill be seen, it is not his equivalent for εστιν in its other uses. So the
existential meaning is marked off.
The philosopher’s form ulation, κίνησις μετέχει τοΰ δντος, both elucidates the sense o f
εστιν in κίνησις εστιν and also makes clear (w hat is not clear in the compressed colloquial
form ulation) the structure o f the fact being stated; makes clear, that is, that a certain connection
is being asserted betw een two concepts. The philosopher’s formulation contains not only the
names o f the two concepts but also a word indicating their coherence (μετέχει), not itself the
name o f an είδος but ju st a sign o f connectedness or synthesis. This point, the role o f μετέχειν in
the dialectician’s language, w ill come up again shortly.
There rem ain two other meanings o f εστιν, as copula and as identity-sign. The
assim ilation o f these had led to a denial o f the possibility o f any true non-tautological statements.
W hat is needed, in order to deprive this paradox o f its power, is a clear demonstration o f how the
two uses o f εστιν differ. By ‘dem onstration’ I do not m ean ‘p ro o f, but ‘exhibition’ or ‘display’.
N ot all absurd philosophical theses can be proved false. Often the only way to sterilize a paradox
is to expose and lay bare the confusion from w hich it springs. So w hat one m ust do for εστιν is to
draw attention to these tw o different uses, indicate how they are related, and if possible provide
for each an alternative mode o f expression so as to help remove even the slightest tem ptation to
confuse the two.
Consider how Plato deals, in 256al0-b4, w ith the pair of statements κίνησις έστι ταύτόν,
κίνησις ούκ εστι ταύτόν. These look like contradictories, yet we want to assert both. However
we need not really be w orried (ού δυσχεραντέον); for we are not in both statements speaking
ομοίως. Analysis o f each statem ent (introduced again by διά) will show us exactly what is being
asserted in each and enable us to see that there is no contradiction between them when they are
properly understood. The first statem ent means κίνησις μετέχει ταύτου. We do not intend to be
denying this when we assert the second statem ent; it means κίνησις μετέχει θατέρου προς
ταύτόν. There is no contradiction.
The essential points in Plato’s analysis or transform ation o f the two statements are these:
(1) where εστιν is being used as copula it gets replaced in the philosopher’s version by μετέχει;
(2) for ούκ εστιν where εστιν occurs not as copula but as identity-sign the philosopher’s version
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is (not ού μετέχει; but) μετέχει θατέρου (προς...)· W hat do these substitutions show? They show
that εστιν serves m erely to connect two concepts w hich are named; that in another use the
concept o f Identity (or D ifference) is expressed, together w ith the fact that something (viz. the
concept named by the subject-word o f the sentence) falls under the concept Identity (or
Difference).
W ith Plato’s procedure here one may compare a passage in Frege’s paper Über B egriff
und G egenstand (I quote Mr. Geach’s translation, in Translations from the Philosophical
Writings o f Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter Geach and M ax Black). One can ju st as well assert o f
a thing that it is Alexander the Great, or is the num ber four, or is the planet Venus, as that it is
green or is a mammal. But, as Frege points out, one m ust distinguish the usages o f the word ‘is’.
‘In the last two examples it serves as a copula, as a mere verbal sign o f predication. (In this sense
the German word ist can sometimes be replaced by the mere personal suffix: cf. dies B latt ist
grün and dies B latt grünt.2) We are here saying that something falls under a concept, and the
grammatical predicate stands for this concept. In the first three examples, on the other hand, ‘is’
is used like the ‘equals’ sign in arithm etic, to express an equation.. . . In the sentence ‘the
m orning star is Venus’, ‘is’ is obviously not the m ere copula; its content is an essential part o f
the predicate, so that the word ‘Venus’ does not constitute the whole o f the predicate. One m ight
say instead: ‘the morning star is no other than V enus’; w hat was previously im plicit in the single
word ‘is’ is here set forth in four separate words, and in ‘is no other than’ the word ‘is’ now
really is the mere copula. W hat is predicated here is thus not Venus but no other than Venus.
These words stand for a concept.’ (pp. 43-44)
Frege explains the copula by talking o f som ething’s falling under a concept. Plato uses
for this the term μετέχειν. Frege expands die ‘is’ o f identity into ‘is no other than’, in which
phrase the ‘is’ is simply the copula and ‘no other th an ... ’ stands for a concept. Plato expands the
εστιν o f identity into μετέχει ταύτου... (and ούκ εστιν into μετέχει θατέρου), where μετέχει does
the copula’s job (‘falls under the concept’) and ταύτόν names a concept. It seems to me that in
offering the analyses he does Plato, no less clearly than Frege, is engaged in distinguishing
different uses o f ‘is’. In all he distinguishes three, and he provides for each different sense o f
εστιν a new mode o f expression (μετέχει..., μετέχει του οντος, μετέχει ταύτου).
The claim that one o f the things Plato does in Sophist 251-259 is to elucidate the
distinction betw een copula and identity-sign would seem to be supported by the following
consideration: that this distinction is ju st w hat is required to immunize us against the paradoxes
o f the οψιμαθείς (25 lb ), and Plato does suppose that these foolish people have been put in their
place by his discussion (259c-d). Robinson however denies that this consideration has any force.
He w rites (p. 174): ‘Plato certainly thought o f his Communion as refuting the “Late Learners”.
But it does not follow that he thought the manner o f refutation was to show that they confused
attribution w ith identity. Ñ or is there anything in the text to show that he thought this.’ Robinson
is certainly right to say that it does not follow . Still we are surely entitled - or rather obliged - to
make some reasonable suggestion as to how exactly Plato did suppose him self to have exposed
the error o f the Tate learners’. If the interpretation o f 256al0-b4 outlined above is right that the
passage contains w hat is an effective exposure o f Tate learners’ who construed every ‘is’ as a
sign o f identity. If so, it is natural to infer that Plato him self regarded the distinction drawn in
that passage (and elsewhere) as the crucial counter-move against the Tate learners’. Further, if
2 One is reminded o f Aristotle, Physics 185b28: oi δέ λέξιν μετερρύθμιζον, δη ό άνθρωπος ού λευκός έστιν άλλα
λελεύκεται, ούδέ βαδίδων έστίν άλλα βαδίζει.
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no other reasonable suggestion can be made as to how exactly Plato did think had disposed o f
the ‘late learners’ this fact can be used as an argument in favour o f the above interpretation o f
256a-b which does find in it an im portant point directly relevant to, and destructive of, the
paradoxical puzzle o f the οψιμαθείς.
Now it might be suggested that it is by his proof that there is Communion among είδη
(25 ld-252e) that Plato refutes the view that only identical statements are possible: that it is here,
and not in some later talk about ov and μή öv, that he supposes him self to be refuting the ‘late
learners’. But what are the arguments by which he proves there is Communion? The first
argument (251e7-252b7) is to the effect that if there were no Communion then philosophers and
‘physicists’ in propounding their various views would in fact have been ‘saying nothing’ (ούδέν
αν λέγοιεν). The argument simply assumes that this last is not the case, that Empedocles and the
rest were talking sense. But this assumption is ju st what the Tate learners’, maintaining their
paradox, would deny; and an argument based upon it is obviously o f no force against them. The
second argument (252b8-dl) is that the theory that there is no Communion cannot be stated
w ithout implying its own falsity. As applied to the Tate learners’ the argument would be: you say
that only identity-statem ents can be true; but this statem ent o f yours - ‘only identity-statements
can be true’ - is not itself an identity-statem ent; so it cannot (on your own admission) be true.
Now this argument is certainly formidable and m ight well put a Tate learner’ to silence: he could
hardly be expected to distinguish between first- and second-order statements. Yet as a refutation
o f the thesis itself it is surely superficial and unsatisfactory. For the thesis was put forward not
only by elderly jokers, but also by serious thinkers, who felt themselves obliged to maintain it for
what seemed to them decisive theoretical reasons. Robinson writes as follows (p. 175) ‘To such
m ore responsible thinkers it is folly to say: “But you obviously say ‘man is good’; and, if you
could not, all discourse w hatever would be im possible, including the paradox that you cannot say
‘m an is good’”. For these thinkers already know that you can say that “man is good” and that the
supposition that you cannot immediately destroys all thought and speech. Their trouble is that,
nevertheless, they seem to see a good reason for denying that you can say that “m an is good”.
W hat they want is to be shown the fallacy in the argum ent which troubles them. They know it
m ust be a fallacy; but they w ant to see what it is. N ow for such thinkers Plato’s exposition o f his
doctrine o f Communion is no help whatever. For he m erely points to the fact that we m ust be
able to say “man is good”, because otherwise no thought or communication would be possible.
He does not even notice any argument to the contrary, m uch less show where they go wrong’. I
agree w ith Robinson that, for the reason he gives, Plato’s proof of Communion cannot be
regarded as disposing satisfactorily o f the paradoxical thesis (even though the second argument
in the proof is valid against the thesis); for nothing is done to expose the error or confusion
which led serious persons to embrace the paradox. The philosophical refutation o f paradoxes (for
instance, Zeno’s paradoxes o f motion) consists o f underm ining the arguments on which the
paradoxical conclusions are based, not in reiterating - w hat everyone knows already - that the
conclusions are absurd. W hile adm itting, therefore, that the proof o f Communion does contain an
argum ent w hich can be properly used against the Tate learners’, I find it hard to believe that this
is the whole o f what Plato has to say to discredit the thesis that only identity-statements can be
true. I should expect to find him , in some other passage, exposing the rotten foundations on
which that thesis was built. And this, I suggest, he does (e.g. in the passage previously discussed)
by clearly distinguishing the two different uses o f εστιν, as copula and as identity-sign, and by
showing how the two uses are related.
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Let us tum now to Comford. He says that the copula ‘has no place anywhere in Plato’s
scheme o f the relations o f Form s’ (p. 279). The relation between Forms that combine ‘blending’ - is a symmetrical relation, so it cannot be the same as the relation o f subject to
predicate in an attributive statement, i.e. the relation indicated by tibe copula (pp. 256-7, cp. p.
266).
First a very general point. The relation ‘being associated w ith’ (or ‘being connected
w ith’) is certainly a symmetrical relation. But there are many different ways in which things or
people m ay be associated or connected: as father and son, employer and employee, and so on.
One may say o f all the members o f a fam ily that each is connected with the other. But if one
wishes to say how they are connected, one w ith another, one must employ such expressions as
‘father o f and ‘niece o f , which do not stand for sym m etrical relations. Now it is agreed by
Com ford that the philosopher’s task, according to Plato, is to ‘discern clearly the hierarchy o f
Forms ... and make out its articulate structure’ (pp. 263-4). Every statement the philosopher
makes, in perform ing this task, may be expected to assert some relationship or association
betw een Forms. And ‘association’ is indeed a sym m etrical relation. But surely the philosopher
could not possibly achieve his purpose w ithout specifying the kind o f association there is in each
case. And he could not do this without bringing in some non-symmetricai relations. Consider the
following small extract o f a possible ‘map o f the Form s’:

The structure exhibited here m ust be described by the philosopher; and to do this he must advert
to a non-symmetrical relationship. Justice and virtue are not merely connected; they are
connected in a particular way: Justice is a species o/V irtue. Similarly, in the above diagram, the
words ‘V irtue’ and ‘Justice’ are not m erely close together; one is under the other.
Non-sym m etrical relations m ust then be invoked if a complex structure is to be
described; and Plato was fully aware o f the com plexity o f structure o f ‘tibe world o f Forms’
(Sophist 253d). N or do his analogies w ith letters and m usical notes (253a-b) support the idea that
the dialectician would, according to him, simply assert symmetrical relationships between εϊδη.
If we are to say whether ‘f and ‘g’ fit together, w ith the aid o f T to make an English word, we
m ust obviously specify the order in w hich the letters are to be taken. ‘G if is not a word, ‘fig’ is.
The order o f notes in music is equally im portant: a given scale is not ju st such-and-such notes,
but such-and-such notes in a certain order. So w hatever terminology one uses to state the facts
about spelling or scales or ‘the w orld o f Form s’, some non-symmetrical relation must be brought
in.
There seems to be a difficulty here for Com ford’s view. For if every philosopher’s
statem ent tells o f a ‘blending’, if the only Communion he can report is symmetrical, how can he
ever express irreducibly non-sym m etrical truths, such as that Justice is a species o f Virtue?
To this it w ill be objected that Sophist 251-9, though it implies that the philosopher w ill
have to investigate and state relations between genera and species, does not itself explore such
relations; so in a proper interpretation o f the passage we should leave them out o f account and
concentrate on how Plato actually proceeds in exhibiting the relations which he does in fact
consider. Let us then look at some o f the statem ents o f Communion which Plato makes.
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First, ‘M otion exists’ (‘change’ would be better; I use Comford’s word). Comford says
(p. 256): ‘ “M otion exists” means that the Form M otion blends with the Form Existence’; and (p.
279); ‘ “M otion blends with Existence” is taken as equivalent to “M otion exists’” . He also says
(p. 278): ‘The relation intended (sc. by “blending) is not the meaning o f the “copula” ...; for we
can equally say “Existence blends w ith M otion’” . Taken together these remarks lead to
absurdity. For if ‘M otion blends w ith Existence’ means ‘Motion exists’, then ‘Existence blends
with M otion’ m ust mean ‘Existence m oves’. Plato certainly did not intend this, and the trouble
clearly lies in Com ford’s insistence on the ‘blending’ metaphor (which suggests a symmetrical
relation) to the exclusion o f other metaphors (which do not). What ‘M otion exists’ is equivalent
to is not ‘M otion blends w ith Existence’ (‘blending’ being symmetrical) but ‘M otion shares in or
partakes o f Existence’ (‘partaking o f being non-symmetrical). If A partakes o f B then it is hue
to say, less determ inately, that A blends w ith B, and this is equivalent to saying that B blends
with A; but ‘A partakes o f B ’ is not equivalent to saying that ‘B partakes o f A ’. Comford’s
remarks quoted above lead to absurdity because he w ill not let into his exposition any nonsymmetrical expression like ‘partakes of, —even though Plato’s exposition bristles w ith this
metaphor.
N ext, ‘M otion is different from R est’. Now this is indeed equivalent to ‘Rest is different
from M otion’. But before drawing any inference concerning ‘Communion’ we must put the
statem ent into its analysed form, into dialectician’s terminology. We get: ‘M otion communicates
w ith Difference from R est’. The question is w hether ‘communicates w ith’ in this formulation can
be taken to stand for a symmetrical relation. But if it is so taken we m ust be prepared to say that
‘M otion communicates w ith Difference from R est’ is equivalent to ‘Difference from Rest
communicates w ith M otion’; for the Communion asserted in the first place is evidently between
M otion on the one hand and D ifference from Rest on the other. But then, since ‘M otion
communicates w ith Difference from R est’ is the technical way of saying that M otion is different
from R est we m ust suppose that ‘Difference from R est communicates w ith M otion’ is the
technical way o f saying that Difference from Rest moves. And we shall find ourselves claiming
that ‘M otion is different from R est’ means the same as ‘Difference from Rest moves’. As before,
this absurd conclusion follows from taking ‘communicates w ith’ as standing for a symmetrical
relation. If ‘M otion communicates w ith Difference from R est’ means that M otion is different
from Rest (as it clearly does), then ‘communicates w ith’ m ust here stand not for ‘blending’ but
for a non-sym m etrical relation (‘partaking o f) . It is true that if A partakes o f Difference from B,
then B partakes o f Difference from A. But this is because o f the symmetrical nature o f
difference; ‘partaking o f is itself not symmetrical.
But these considerations, it m ay be said, are still too general and involve too much
extrapolation and ‘interpretation’. This objection is reasonable but hardly decisive. One must
suppose that Plato had something intelligible and consistent in his mind when writing the very
taut piece o f exposition in Sophist 251-9. If Com ford’s account leads, on reflection, to grave
difficulties or absurdities this is a prim a facie argum ent against it.
Still it is certainly necessary to look closely at the details o f Plato’s terminology.
Considering the various term s he uses in speaking o f relations among είδη, one would expect
some (e.g. συμμείγνυσθαι) to stand for the rather indeterm inate symmetrical notion ‘association’,
and others (e.g. μετέχειν) to stand for som e m ore determ inate non-symmetrical relation.
Com ford denies that this expectation is ftdfilled. Speaking o f statements about genus and species
he w rites (pp. 296-7): ‘The appropriate word would be “partake o f ’ (μετέχειν), indicating that
genus and species are blended but do not coincide. But he (sc. Plato) does not use “partake o f ’
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w ith precision or distinguish “partaking” from the mutual relation called “blending” or
“combining” (συμμειξις, κοινωνία)’. Com ford supports his assertion that ‘participation’ between
Forms is a symmetrical relation by reference to 255d4 (p. 256): ‘A t 255c,d Existents (όντα) are
divided into two Forms or Kinds (το καθ’ αυτό and τό προς άλλο) and then Existence is
described as “partaking o f ’ both these subordinate Forms. So the generic Form partakes o f
(blends with) die specific form no less than the specific Form partakes o f the generic’. And in his
footnote on 255d4, he says: ‘Note that Existence, w hich includes both these Forms (sc. το καθ’
αυτό and τό προς άλλο), is said to partake o/both. This is one of the places which show that
“partaking o f ’ is symmetrical in the case o f the Form s.’ I do not know w hich are the other places
Com ford alludes to: his explicit argument that μέθεξις is symmetrical (hence nothing to do w ith
the copula) rests on the one passage 255d. He does not pay special attention to all the other
occurrences o f the μεθεξις metaphor. N or does he consider the possibility that μεθεξις does not
always stand for a reciprocal relation; one would be prepared to find that it sometimes did
(‘being associated w ith’) and sometimes did not (‘sharing in’).
Professor K arl Dürr, in his paper “M oderne D arstellung der platonischen Logik”
{Museum Helveticum 1945, especially pp. 171-175), assigned precise and distinct meanings to
various term s used by Plato in Sophist 251-9, but did not attempt a full justification. Sir David
Ross has made the following im portant observation, in Plato ’s Theory o f Ideas, p. 111, n. 6:
‘Plato uses κοινωνία, κοινωνεΐν, επικοινωνία, προσκοινωνεΐν in two different constructions w ith the genitive (250b9,252a2, b9,254c5,256b2,260e2) and with the dative (251d9, e8,
252d3,253a8,254b8, c l, 257a9,260e5). In the form er usage the verbs mean “share in”; in the
latter they m ean “combine w ith” or “communicate w ith”.’ I do not know why Ross adds that
‘though Plato uses the two different constructions, he does not seem to attach any importance to
the difference between them .’ Plato does not use the two constructions indiscriminately or
interchangeably. A comparison between the two groups o f passages yields a clear result (I leave
out o f account 260e2 and e5, w hich are in the perplexing discussion o f false belief, not in the
m ain section on κοινωνία γενών; 250b9 is also outside this section). Κοινωνεΐν followed by the
genitive (e.g. του ετέρου) is used where the fact being asserted is that some είδος is (copula)
such-and-such (e.g. different from ...), i.e. it is used to express the fact that one conceptfa lls
under another. The dative construction, on the other hand, is used in highly general remarks
about the connectedness o f είδη, where no definite fact as to any particular pair o f είδη is being
stated. Surely this confirms - what ordinary Greek usage would suggest - that Plato consciously
uses the word κοινωνεΐν in two different ways: in one it stands for the general symmetrical
notion o f ‘connectedness’, in the other it stands for a determinate non-symmetrical notion,
‘sharing in’. The form er is appropriate to broad comments on the inter-connection o f είδη, but
the latter is required when the precise relations o f particular είδη are to be stated.
As for μετέχειν two points are especially important. Firstly, in 251-9 the verb (or its
noun) occurs 13 tim es. One o f these occurrences is in the passage used by Comford in his
argum ent quoted above (255d4). But in all the other twelve cases it is clear that the truth
expressed by ‘A-ness μετέχει B -ness’ is that A -ness is (copula) B, and never that B-ness is
(copula) A. For instance, το ον μετέχει θατέρου... form ulates the fact that Existence is different
from ... ; it does not serve equally to express the fact that Difference exists - that is expressed by
θατέρου μετέχει του όντος. This would surely be a rem arkable coincidence if the relation Plato
intended by μετέχειν were in fact symmetrical.
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Secondly, it is worth attending particularly to the passage officially devoted to the
statem ent o f certain relations among the five chosen είδη, 255e8-257al 1. Here the objective is to
state definite truths in careful philosophical term inology; not merely to advert to the fact that
there are connections among είδη but to say precisely what some o f them are. Now in this
passage Com ford’s favourite m etaphor occurs once (256b9), in a purely general reference to the
connectedness o f concepts (εϊπερ των γενών συγχωρησόμεθα τα μεν άλλήλοις έθέλειν
μείγνυσθαι, τα δέ μή). And κοινωνία w ith the dative occurs once in an equally unspecific context
(έπείπερ εχει κοινωνίαν άλλήλοις ή των γενών φύσις, 256a9). The other term s used are as
follows: κοινωνία w ith the genitive occurs once (256a2) and is used to state the definite
relationship holding between two named είδη (κίνησις and θάτερον); the fact stated is that
M otion is different from ..., and not that Difference moves. Μ εταλαμβάνειν occurs once (256b6)
in a passage whose interpretation is controversial. B ut the significance o f the verb is clear. If it
were true to say ‘κίνησις μεταλαμβάνει στάσεως’ then one could rightly say ‘κίνησις έστι
στάσιμος.’ Μ ετέχειν (or μέθεξις) occurs five tim es (256al, a7, b l, d9, e3), in each case
expressing the relation between tw o nam ed είδη the first o f which falls under the second. Thus
all the real work in the section 255e8-257al 1, all the exposition o f actual connections between
particular είδη, is done by the term s μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, and κοινωνεΐν (with genitive),that is, by the non-symmetrical metaphor ‘partaking o f which Comford is so determined to
exclude. And the role o f ‘partaking o f in Plato’s term inology is clear: ‘partakes o f followed by
an abstract noun, the name o f a concept, is equivalent to the ordinary language expression
consisting o f ‘is’ (copula) followed by the adjective derived from that abstract noun.
This examination o f Plato’s use o f some term s, though obviously far from exhaustive, is,
I think, sufficient to discredit Com ford’s insistence on ‘blending’ as the one safe clue to Plato’s
meaning, and to establish that μετέχειν and its variants μεταλαμβάνειν and κοινωνεΐν (with
genitive) are not used by Plato as mere alternatives for συμμειγνυσθαι. I w ill relegate to a note3

3 255c 12-d7. Plato’s purpose here is to establish that to óv and τ6 έτερον are two different γένη. But it is difficult to
interpret the argument in a way that makes it even seem plausible. The obvious interpretation is this: Some όντα are
called what they are καθ’ αύτό, others πρ6ς άλλο; but all έτερα are called what they are προς άλλο; therefore to ov is
a different concept from to έτερον. The difficulty with this is that, as Plato insists, every single είδος partakes both
o f τ6 öv and το ετερον. So any sub-division o f είδη that are δντα is straightway a sub-division o f είδη that are έτερα.
The two concepts cannot be distinguished by contrasting the είδη that fall under one with those that fall under the
other; for there is no such contrast.
Perhaps the point about Difference is this: that anything that is different is necessarily d ifferen t/^ »»....
Then indeed there is a proper contrast with Existence, but it is not the contrast Plato seems to be describing. The
contrast is that anything that is existent is (sim ply) existent,- and not existent to, of, or from ...; i.e. Difference is
essentially πρός άλλο. Existence is essentially καθ’ αύτό. But this is not what Plato is saying.
Leaving the interpretation o f the argument undecided, let us try to elucidate the meaning o f μετέχειν in
255d4 by noticing the reason Plato advances for asserting that Existence ‘partakes o f both τό καθ’ αύτό and to πρός
άλλο. The reason is not that both o f these ‘partake o f Existence. If ‘partaking’ just meant ‘blending’ this would in
fact be a perfectly adequate reason; by the same token it would be obvious that Difference too ‘partook o f both τό
καθ’ αύτό and τό πρός άλλο, since each o f them certainly must ‘partake o f Difference. Plato’s reason for saying that
Existence ‘partakes o f both is that some είδη that partake o f Existence (some όντα) also partake o f τό καθ’ αύτό,
w hile other είδη that partake o f Existence also partake o f τό πρός άλλο. This at least is the plainest meaning o f
255cl2-13. And if this is Plato’s reason we can perhaps make use o f it in interpreting the statement that Existence
άμφοΐν μετέχει τοΐν είδοΐν (255d4). Μ ετέχει here stands neither for ‘blending’ nor for the simple notion o f
‘partaking o f found in so many other passages. It stands for a more complex relation which is, however, ‘reducible’
in a certain way to the ordinary simple ‘partaking o f . If, for mere convenience, we call this more complex relation
‘sharing in’, we can offer the follow ing analysis: ‘A shares in both B and C’ means the same as ‘Some είδη that
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some remarks about 255d, the passage Com ford exploits; if necessary it must be frankly
adm itted that in this passage μετέχειν is used in an exceptional way. But one passage cannot be
allowed to outweigh a dozen others.
I have tried to argue, first, that the verb μετέχειν (w ith its variants) has a role in Plato’s
philosophical language corresponding to the role o f the copula in ordinary language; and,
second, that by his analysis o f various statem ents Plato brings out (and means to bring out) the
difference between the copula (μετέχει...), the sign o f identity (μετέχει ταύτοΰ) and the
existential εστιν (μετέχει του οντος).

partake o f A partake o f B, and some είδη that partake o f A partake o f C \ So μετέχειν in 255d4 is indeed used
differently from how it is used in other places. But it still stands for a non-symmetrical relation; a relation,
moreover, which can be fully explained in terms o f the ordinary notion o f μέθεξις.

